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### SUMMARY

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# **GENERAL**

1.	Egyptian Foreign Minister promoted Arab opposition in UN to Mutual				
	Security Program: 3.3(h)(2				
	The Egyptian Foreign Minister brought pressure on the Arab and Asiatic delegations at the UN General Assembly meetings last week to vote against the US on the Soviet resolution denouncing the Mutual Security Program. In revealing Egypt's diplomatic maneuvers,				
	Charles Malik, Lebanese delegate to the UN, added that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had urged these delegations at least to abstain on the Soviet resolution if they could not register positive support.				
	Comment: While the Soviet resolution was defeated, the Egyptian Foreign Minister's efforts at Paris may have been important in inducing the abstention by the Arab and Asiatic delegations during the vote on 21 December. There have been other reports that Egypt may be supporting Soviet objectives in the UN in return for Soviet support in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.				
2.	Western Europe concerned over newly defined US export policy:  3.3(h)(2				
	Both Britain and France are concerned that the Battle Act may make impossible further co-operation in controlling East-West trade through the Coordinating Committee. The Belgian delegate to COCOM has privately asked the other European members for their attitudes toward the American policy of denying to Europe US exports of commodities shipped from Western Europe to the Orbit.				
	Comment: Some European delegates to COCOM resent the newly enunciated US export policy, since they feel that it eliminates the multilateral approach to East-West trade.				



### FAR EAST

3.	Far East Command estimates enemy could challenge UN air superiority over battle area:  3.3(h)(2)
	The US Far East Command now estimates that the improvement in overall Communist air effectiveness, combined with increased activity against UN night-flying aircraft, could enable the enemy to challenge UN air superiority over the immediate combat areas and to engage in air strikes against UN ground forces and installations. The Far East Command cites the bombing and strafing of UN-held islands as indicating an advanced state of readiness of at least one regiment of enemy bombers. Additionally, the jet fighter attack on UN front-line positions in early December, although ineffectual, is noted as positive evidence of the enemy's capability, while the flights of unidentified jets over Seoul on the 3rd and 8th of December are cited as the possible beginning of reconnaissance over the front-line and Seoul areas.
	SOUTH ASIA
4.	Pakistan agreeable to postponement of Kashmir discussions: 3.3(h)(2
: [	Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, in discussing the second Graham report on Kashmir, left the impression that while Pakistan may continue, for the record, to press for quick action, it will have no real objection to postponement of discussions in the Security Council until the Indian elections are over.
	Zafrullah said he felt no useful purpose would be

served by prolonging Graham's mediatory effort and that further progress could be made only if the Security Council were to adopt a demilitarization program of its own and call upon India and Pakistan to implement it with the assistance of a UN representative.



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Comment: Graham drew up twelve proposals aimed at solving the Kashmir dispute. India and Pakistan agreed on eight of the twelve. There is no indication that agreement on the remainder is about to be achieved. The noncommittal reaction of the Pakistani Foreign Minister gives little clue as to Pakistan's intentions, despite its willingness not to press for immediate action.

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compromise affecting the Sudan" makes it unlikely that Foreign Secretary Eden can be induced to compromise on the Sudan as a means for settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Britain considers itself morally obligated not to recognize King Farouk as King of the Sudan without consulting the Sudanese, and estimates that the latter would revolt against such an idea, believing that Egypt would not be content with mere titular sovereignty. A plebiscite now in the Sudan would be impractical and would only confirm the factional splits that already exist.

Commenting on Eden's strong personal convictions on the subject, the Embassy suggests that he might be willing at least to discuss the Sudan if it became evident that solution of the Middle East Command problem hinged on this question.

7.	Libya	delays	accepting	credentials	$\mathbf{of}$	Egyptian	Minister

Egypt's Minister-designate to the new state of 3.3(h)(2) Libya arrived in Benghazi unannounced on 20 December and unsuccessfully attempted to present his credentials to the Libyan King. The

Libyan Prime Minister insisted that proper credentials had not yet been received from Egypt and that he would study the matter further. Although reluctant to accept the credentials from the "King of Egypt and the Sudan," the Prime Minister does not wish to offend Egypt.

<u>Comment</u>: Egypt has reportedly been giving financial support to Bechir Saadawi, an important opposition leader in Tripoli, who has shown a strong anti-Western attitude. Libya's action is bound to anger the Egyptian Government and to increase Egyptian opposition to the new Libyan Government.

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#### WESTERN EUROPE

8. Dutch Government begins crackdown on Communists in its service:

3.3(h)(2)

The Netherlands Government has just extended its list of "forbidden organizations" for civil servants to include the Communist Party of the Netherlands, the Communist-controlled labor nist front organizations. Mombarghin in these

federation and other Communist front organizations. Membership in these organizations can be reason for dismissal. The non-Communist political parties fully support the government's action.

The US Embassy at The Hague comments that this measure has been contemplated for two and one half years and that it is aimed primarily at municipal civil servants in such Communist Party centers as Amsterdam and Zaandam.

Comment: Communist strength in the government is confined primarily to the lower echelons in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Zaandam. The government's action will further circumscribe the limited Communist capabilities in the Netherlands.

